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CHOOSING AMONG ANTITRUST LIABILITY 
STANDARDS UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: 
ASSESSMENTS OF AND AVERSIONS TO THE RISK OF 
BEING WRONG 
By Barbara Ann White' 
David McGowan observes in his symposium article, Between Logic 
and Experience: Error Costs and United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1 that 
conceivably in the realm of theory, the different schools of thought on 
how to evaluate and treat suspicious anticompetitive activity could coin-
cide with each other.2 What prevents this from happening, he suggests, is 
that in the realm of reality, courts must make decisions under conditions of 
imperfect information, not only as to the anticompetitiveness of the scruti-
nized conduct but also as to the impact of their decisions, since incomplete 
information implies a risk that whatever the court decides, the decision is 
wrong.3 This yields the possibility of "error costs,,,4 both of "false posi-
tives" (finding anticompetitive conduct when in fact it is welfare-
enhancing) and "false negatives" (finding the conduct efficient when in 
fact it is anti competitive ). McGowan argues that since the gaps in actual 
knowledge in any particular case must be overcome by certain leaps of 
faith, the guidelines an antitrust scholar advocates (or a particular court 
adopts) to evaluate specific conduct must to a certain extent turn on ideol-
ogy; pure logic cannot resolve completely the uncertainty embedded in the 
incomplete information.5 As a corollary to his thesis, McGowan noted dur-
ing the presentation that it would be interesting to explore why different 
antirust scholars adopt different ideological solutions to the logically unre-
solvable problems. 
© Barbara Ann White 
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore; Chair, Section on Antitrust 
and Trade Regulation of the Association of American Law Schools. This Commentary 
discusses several papers presented at an antitrust panel, Evolving Antitrust Treatment of 
Dominant Firms, at the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) 2005 Annual 
Meeting. I wish to thank Steve Salop, David McGowan, Doug Melamed, and Alan Meese 
for useful comments. 
1. David McGowan, Between Logic and Experience: Error Costs and United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., 20 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1185 (2005). 
2. !d. at 1187, 1244-45. 
3. Id. at 1187. 
4. Id. at 1186 n.2. 
5. !d. at 1242. 
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The other two papers for this symposium, Douglas Melamed's article, 
Exclusionary Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws: Balancing, Sacrifice, 
and Refusals to Deal,6 and Steven Salop's paper, "Section 2, Consumer 
Welfare Effects, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard,,,7 each take 
their own approach regarding conduct evaluation. The two also discuss 
extensively the problem of error costs, albeit reaching different conclu-
sions as to their impact and treatment. 8 Melamed proposes a specifically 
defined measure of evaluating a firm's exclusionary conduct based on 
whether or not the conduct's profitability depends solely on rivals exiting, 
or the "profit sacrifice test," in order to expand on capturing false nega-
tives without much sacrifice in the way of false positives.9 Salop proposes 
a more comprehensive evaluation by suggesting that courts consider the 
scrutinized conduct's overall im~act on consumer welfare, or the "con-
sumer welfare effects standard."} Salop's proposal is to expand even fur-
ther the capture of false negatives. 
I agree with McGowan's overall analysis of the source of conflict be-
tween the current predominant views regarding the treatment of poten-
tially anticompetitive conduct, particularly as it pertains to the conduct of 
dominant firms. I agree that the differences arise from the incomplete in-
formation that necessarily informs and renders uncertain the impact of de-
cisions regarding firms' conduct. Though with additional analysis regard-
ing whether antitrust decisions should be based on our experience rather 
than logic leads McGowan to conclude that his particular antitrust per-
spective-relying on the market rather than the courts for correction of 
anticompetitive conduct, or the "market correction approach"-is the su-
perior one, II I am more persuaded, within the same framework, by 
Melamed's more interventionist standard of the profit sacrifice test and am 
most persuaded by Salop's even more encompassing consumer welfare 
effects standard. 
I also think McGowan's insight that the differences among scholars 
(and courts) are ideologic more than differences in logic can be usefully 
refined further. McGowan ascribes the source of ideological differences to 
the differences in faith in the marketplace versus faith in the government 
6. A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws: Balanc-
ing, Sacrifice, and Refusals to Deal, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247 (2005). 
7. Steven Salop, Section 2, Consumer Welfare Effects, and the Flawed Profit-
Sacrifice Standard (May 11, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
8. Melamed, supra note 6, at 1257-61; Salop, supra note 7, at 53-54. 
9. Melamed, supra note 6, at 1255-57. 
10. Salop, supra note 7, at 3,24-28,48. 
11. McGowan, supra note 1, at 1242-45. 
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to regulate effectively, whether the errors are with regard to anticompeti-
tive conduct or with regard to the errors in the decisions themselves. 12 
This suggests, for him, that the various points of view fall into one of two 
categories: either a market correction approach or an integrationist ap-
proach, in which consideration of the potential error costs of the decision 
are integrated into the decision process itself.13 McGowan advocates the 
former while Melamed and -Salop presumably fall into the latter. 
I believe, however, that the differences in viewpoint are affected not 
only by which correction tool a scholar or court find more effective (the 
market or the government), but also by the differences in their evaluation 
of the consequences of the false positives versus the false negatives in the 
specific instance under consideration. Inherent in any antitrust decision is 
a trade-off between the risk of a false positive and a false negative. As 
such, the differences in the valuation of those consequences may lead 
scholars and courts to differ in their reluctance to undertake the risks of 
particular outcomes when they choose to guard against one error as op-
posed to the other in a particular case. Therefore, I suggest that one's anti-
trust position is not only informed by one's belief in the ability of the mar-
ketplace relative to the government to correct anticompetitive problems, 
but also to the degree, in any particular circumstance, one is more risk-
averse to the consequences of one error cost over the other. Incorporating 
a risk-averse analysis into the framework set forth by McGowan allows 
for a continuum of approaches rather than a stark categorization into two 
camps. This then allows for a distinction, in the context of that continuum, 
between Melamed's and Salop's papers. Thus, I would place McGowan's 
perspective-primary reliance on the marketplace-toward one end; 
Salop's perspective, which recommends a relatively broad and more fine-
tuned government evaluation of conduct, toward the other; and Melamed's 
perspective of specific fmite criteria to determine intervention, somewhere 
in the middle. 
McGowan expands on his analysis of differences arising from the fu-
sion of the ideologic with the logic by assessing how informative actual 
experience is with regard to practical application of the different views, as 
compared with what decisions the logic of these different views would 
dictate. He suggests that even though theoretical developments might 
guide us to more nuanced decision making in antitrust matters, the same 
element of imperfect information that requires us to supplement logical 
conclusions with ideological choices also compels us at times to choose 
12. Id. at 1197-99. 
13. Id. at 1186-88. 
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what experience tells us is a more effective practical course over what our 
theory would choose.14 McGowan uses the Microsoft case to prove his 
point: that at times experience (of the practicalities) should trump logic 
(no matter how insightful or far-reaching theory takes us in the theoretical 
plane).15 In particular, McGowan argues that though the Microsoft court 
couched its opinion in a theoretical framework which suggested a fairly 
strong integrationist approach, ultimately. the actual liabilities and reme-
dies accomplished very little in the way of change. 16 This, he notes, is 
close to the outcome that would have occurred if a market correction ap-
proach had been adopted instead (and the case never brought).17 His 
analysis of the Microsoft case, therefore, argues for more reliance on the 
market correction approach for practical reasons even if, in theory, one 
supports a more integrationist approach. For McGowan, the Microsoft 
case even suggests that the integrationist approach is, in practical terms, a 
failure, as clearly the track record of government intervention has been 
rather abysmal, at least in the general purpose computing market. IS 
Unstated in McGowan's assertion-that the various approaches would 
coincide in theory if not for the practical impingement of imperfect infor-
mation-is that, currently, most antitrust scholars adhere to the view that 
the goal is to maximize consumer welfare and therefore that standard 
should underlie antitrust judgments with regard to specific conduct. This, 
of course, contrasts with antitrust's past judicial history, when there was a 
strong sentiment in favor of preserving the number of competitors for its 
own sake as an ideal for maintaining competitive markets. This older stan-
dard gave way to the current view of judging conduct in light of consumer 
welfare in the wake of the Chicago School revolution. Certainly, not only 
is the consumer welfare standard implied by McGowan's discussion,19 it is 
also more explicitly expressed in both Melamed's and Salop's papers?O 
Consumer welfare is a concept from economics, and to the extent that 
there is agreement among modem day antitrust scholars that not only is 
consumer welfare the benchmark by which business conduct should be 
14. Id. at 1197-99. 
15. Id. at 1211-12. 
16. Id. at 1223-25. 
17. Id. at 1244-45. 
18. Id. at 1189. 
19. [d. at 1188. 
20. Melamed, supra note 6, at 1252 ("The principal function of an antitrust rule in a 
law enforcement regime is to create appropriate incentives for the avoidance of welfare-
reducing conduct."); Salop, supra note 7, at 2 ("[A]ntitrust law is said to be a 'consumer 
welfare prescription.'''); see Salop, supra note 7, at 23-40 (describing further the con-
sumer welfare standard). 
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judged but also as to how it is defined,21 McGowan's assertion that the 
various views regarding antitrust treatment would coincide with each other 
in a world of perfect infonnation is all the more convincing.22 
In order to explain why I am most persuaded, within the context of 
McGowan's framework, by the approach at the other end of the contin-
uum-Salop's consumer welfare effects standard-it might be useful to 
examine the ways the three papers fall along a continuum. The philoso-
phies of the three papers might be summarized as follows. 
McGowan's market correction view holds that the government, 
whether by court or administrative action, should only interfere with busi-
ness conduct when the conduct is unambiguously anticompetitive in na-
ture and, moreover, egregiously so. Any lesser standard increases the risk 
of a false positive, as more ambiguous conduct is more likely to be judged 
erroneously in violation of antitrust law.23 The subsequent interference by 
the government to "correct" this erroneously judged violation will cause a 
disruption in the workings of the marketplace, creating inefficiencies that 
are consumer welfare-reducing.24 This perspective recognizes that by leav-
ing alone more ambiguous behavior, the false negatives that otherwise 
might have been caught, although welfare-reducing in the short tenn, will 
be remedied by forces the market will create to correct and, thus, remove 
the resultant inefficiencies. The assessment of the "market correctionists" 
is that harm done by the government from false positives (far) exceeds the 
hann done by false negatives because the market is more capable and effi-
cient at correcting the latter than either the government or the market is 
able to correct the fonner. 25 Of course, this reflects the valuation assess-
ment by those who support this view and demonstrates a high degree of 
risk averseness to the consequences of false positives. 
21. There is debate as to what are the welfare measures that antitrust seeks or ought 
to seek to maximize-that is whether to maximize "consumer welfare" or "aggregate (or 
total) welfare." See Salop, supra note 7, at 24 n.58. There is also the issue of whether 
courts adopt the consumer welfare standard in section 2 cases. Alan Meese observes that 
some courts have rejected such an approach since 1955. E-mail from Alan Meese, Pro-
fessor of Law, William & Mary School of Law, to Barbara Ann White, Professor of Law, 
University of Baltimore School of Law (May 13,2005) (on file with author). 
22. One sometimes hears of positions such as Melamed's and Salop's as being of 
the old school view, in that they do focus on what happens to rivals in the course of the 
defendant firm's scrutinized conduct. Thus, it is important to recognize, as clearly 
McGowan does by implication, that observations of effects on rivals of particular conduct 
do not mean abandonment of the modem day measure of consumer welfare. 
23. McGowan, supra note 1, at 1190-91. 
24. /d. 
25. Id. at 1189. 
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Melamed advocates the profit sacrifice test. To a certain extent, the 
motivations underlying the test are concerns similar to the market correc-
tion approach, in that the goal is to create a standard that has a low prob-
ability of a false positive.26 The profit sacrifice test also has, however, the 
advantage of casting a wider net to capture true positives than does the 
market correction view. As Melamed defines the profit sacrifice test, the 
question is whether the incremental cost to the firm of the conduct under 
scrutiny exceeds the incremental revenues or cost savings the fum 
achieves (not including increased revenues or reduced costs that are due 
solely to rivals' exit as a result of the scrutinized conduct).27 If the incre-
mental revenues exceed the incremental costs, then the activity makes 
sense for the firm to undertake (that is, it is profitable) regardless of 
whether rivals exit or not. The conclusion is then that the exit of the rivals 
is ancillary to the conduct and not an antitrust violation. However, if the 
conduct is profitable only if rivals exit-that is, without their exit, the firm 
would actually be sacrificing profits-then the profit sacrifice test con-
cludes that the primary intent of the conduct is to exclude rivals from the 
market for profit purposes?8 Furthermore, the conduct is necessarily con-
sumer welfare-reducing and thus properly condemned as anticompeti-
tive.29 The advocates of the profit sacrifice test argue that this measure 
captures more of what would otherwise be false negatives under the mar-
ket correction approach while not, in any significant way, increasing false 
positives. 
The consumer welfare effects standard is a more wide-ranging balanc-
ing test than either of the other two. It is designed to cast a much broader 
net for true positives and, through government intervention, come closer to 
the goal of enhancing consumer welfare, the benchmark goal underlying 
all three views.3o The consumer welfare effects standard acknowledges an 
inherent problem in judging antitrust conduct, and that problem is, for the 
most part, that most business conduct has both procompetitive and anti-
26. Melamed, supra note 6, at 1257. 
27. Id. at 1255-56. 
28. Id. 
29. Melamed notes that it is not necessary for the firm to "sacrifice" profits-that is, 
lose profits but for the exit of the rivals-for the conduct to fail profit sacrifice test. Pre-
sumably, even if the conduct was a break-even proposition for the firm without its rivals 
exiting but profitable upon their exit, then the inference would be that the intent behind 
the conduct was merely anti competitive and would still be condemned. Id. 
30. Salop emphasizes that the consumer welfare effects standard focuses solely on 
the welfare of consumers and not on aggregate welfare. See Salop, supra note 7, at 24 
n.58; discussion supra note 21. 
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competitive effects?l In other words, with most business activity, one can 
find welfare-enhancing as well as welfare-reducing aspects. The court's 
task is to weigh the factual evidence of welfare enhancement against the 
evidence of welfare reduction and if the enhancement exceeds the reduc-
tion the finn is not held liable; vice versa, the finn is found in violation of 
the antitrust laws.32 
The primary criticism of the market correction approach is fairly obvi-
ous: it leaves too many false negatives-that is, it leaves too many firms 
engaging in welfare-reducing conduct unconstrained. Those who critique 
the market correction approach, as McGowan says, do not have much faith 
in the market to correct false negatives?3 The advocates of both the profit 
sacrifice test and the consumer welfare effects standard--or, as McGowan 
would have it, the integrationists-assess the persistence of the welfare 
reduction from the exclusionary behavior of dominant finns as a much 
graver consequence than do the market correctionists. The integrationists 
not only perceive the government as capable of properly assessing anti-
competitive conduct, but they also evaluate the consequences of the false 
positives as less severe than do the market correctionists.34 Typically, the 
integrationists also see the consequential effects of false positives as much 
less than the conse~uential effects of the false negatives if those conducts 
are left unchecked.3 Thus, the integrationists are highly motivated to find 
and refine the tools the government can employ to gauge more correctly 
the net welfare effects of specific business conduct. 
The criticism of the profit sacrifice test, from the perspective of the 
market correctionists, is the perceived increase in the risk of false posi-
tives,36 which the market correctionists evaluate at a very high cost to so-
ciety. The advocates of the consumer welfare effects standard-the con-
sumerists-view the profit sacrifice test as good but not enough. The 
profit sacrifice test alone is not sufficient to capture as many of the true 
positives as the consumerists believe is possible, and thus leaves too many 
false negatives for the consumerists' comfort. More than the profit sacri-
fice test is needed and is possible, the consumerists argue. Salop, through 
an example of suspect predatory pricing, asserts that the profit sacrifice 
test may create a false positive and thus it may fail in its effort to increase 
31. Salop, supra note 7, at 47. 
32. Id. at 52-54. 
33. McGowan, supra note 1,1192-93. 
34. See, e.g., id. at 1192-99. 
35. See, e.g., id. 
36. Melamed, supra note 6, at 1259-60. 
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the number of true positives (that is, reduce the number of false negatives) 
without simultaneously increasing the number of false positives.37 
The supporters of the profit sacrifice test argue in their defense that the 
test yields a fairly simple and straightforward rule that not only is rela-
tively easy for jurists to apply but also creates a measure of certainty for 
firms, assuring that the firms can continue to engage in innovative pro-
competitive conduct without being caught in a .tangled net of antitrust ac-
cusations that may have no merit.38 Clearly, the advocates of the profit 
sacrifice test weigh the consequences of false negatives far more heavily 
than the market correctionists, but like the market correctionists, they also 
measure the consequences of false positives fairly strongly; The profit sac-
rifice test seems to its supporters to take skillful advantage of the eco-
nomic insights into the workings of the firm to fashion a rule that captures 
anticompetitive conduct with more precision than previous standards with 
small risk of increasing false positives. This middle ground, to its support-
ers, seems to be the best of all choices. The test also appeals to our instinct 
that a profit-maximizing firm would not forgo profits unless it anticipates 
recouping them at some later date. 
The primary criticism of the consumer welfare effect standard is that 
its biggest advantage is also its biggest disadvantage. This is also when 
McGowan's "experience ought to trump logic in the world of practicali-
ties" argument has its most persuasive import. The consumer welfare ef-
fect standard is a broader-ranged nuanced analysis requiring examination 
of the impact of scrutinized conduct on consumers' welfare overall, with 
particular attention paid to price, quality, and innovation.39 In addition, the 
standard considers a much broader range of conduct. Though in theory this 
has great appeal because it addresses directly the presumptive goal of anti-
trust-maximizing consumer welfare-and it should reduce dramatically 
the likelihood of false negatives, from a practical perspective, its critics 
hold that its application is untenable. Judges are not skilled enough to 
evaluate the complex economic arguments and data analyses asserting 
consumer welfare enhancement or reduction, nor are they able to properly 
weigh the measures of the two to conclude what the net effects are. Juries 
are even less capable. Moreover, even examining data to put forth plaintiff 
or defendant arguments is extremely difficult and expensive, taking great 
37. Salop, supra note 7, at 19-20. 
38. Melamed, supra note 6, 1256-27. 
39. Salop, supra note 7, at 3-4,25. 
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talent and skill. To some, it seems perhaps impossible to achieve prop-
erly.40 
That is one of the points McGowan makes in his article with regard to 
the Microsoft case. There the very best analysts in the country argued on 
both sides. In theory the court sided with the consumerists in its analysis 
but concluded with a "tapioca pudding" of effect.41 McGowan argues that 
the conduct that was in fact most market-enhancing for Microsoft went 
unpunished and the conduct with trivial implications was what was sanc-
tioned with trivial results.42 
Finally, a serious problem with a welfare approach for evaluating con-
duct is that each case is very situation specific. The welfare effects stan-
dard creates an environment with limited precedential value. Businesses 
will not know how to proceed when desiring to undertake innovation; 
what seems like an arbitrary antitrust web may fall on them at any time, 
and is more likely to do so the more successful they are, as great success 
usually breeds the exit of others. Some argue that the welfare effects ap-
proach could hamper creativity and economic progress.43 Even if it could 
be properly implemented, the welfare effect standard seems doomed not to 
succeed. 
Thus, the consumer welfare effect standard seems to be a paradigm of 
what McGowan was referring to in his argument that sometimes experi-
ence should trump logic. The consumer welfare effect standard is essen-
tially perfect in theory, comporting precisely and logically with all modem 
scholars' views that the goal of antitrust law should be consumer welfare 
enhancement. But in practice, given its complexity, the difficulties in im-
plementing it effectively, and its confusing implications for predictable 
precedent,the consumer welfare effects standard seems doomed to failure. 
Experience seems to tell us that this logic should be trumped. 
With such dire evaluations, why then might the consumer welfare ef-
fects standard seem the most persuasive? There are several reasons. 
First, its appeal does not rely just on a lack of faith in the market cor-
rection approach. The appeal is more than just ideologic. Not only is the 
lack of faith in the market's ability to correct anticompetitive behavior a 
factor, but also the recognition of the unlikelihood that, even when the 
market does manage to move the actors to more efficient conduct, the in-
40. See Melamed, supra note 6, at 1253-54. Melamed also concludes that such bal-
ancing tests would improperly evaluate product innovation and price-cutting behavior, as 
well. See id. at 1267. 
41. McGowan, supra note 1, at 1189. 
42. Id. at 1226. 
43. See, e.g., Melamed, supra note 6, at 1253-54. 
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dustry will now progress on an economic path that is the not one consum-
ers would have chosen but for the initial anticompetitive conduct. It is one 
thing for the marketplace to move all parties to some efficient conduct, it 
is another to adopt the same efficient path that was emerging before the 
exclusionary conduct. 
Despite the fact that economic efficiency is often expressed as syn-
onymous with maximizing welfare-it is not. Efficiency is, of course, a 
necessary condition for a maximally welfare-enhancing allocation of re-
sources. However, more than firms operating efficienctly is needed. What 
is well-known by those steeped in economic analysis of antitrust law but 
seems to have been forgotten-or at least not mentioned during discus-
sions of antitrust issues-is that there is not a sole, unique economically 
efficient path on which an economy can progress. As basic economic 
analysis teaches us, for every given allocation of initial resources, there 
are a multitude of efficient paths; and for every set of initial resources, 
there are multiple efficient allocations. It is the interaction of constraints 
from different sources outside the marketplace as well as efficiency forces 
within the marketplace that affect which of these economic paths will be 
followed. Much of the outside force is derived from consumer preferences, 
but other factors can affect the direction as well. Anticompetitive behavior 
at critical points in an industry's development can alter the direction of 
economic progress and is likely to do so counter to consumer preferences. 
It is in that context that full faith in market correction of anticompeti-
tive conduct seems, at best, tenuous. Though most agree that inefficiency 
by firms will be eroded by market forces-and anticompetitive behavior is 
typically viewed as inefficient-it is not convincing that the efficient path 
the industry will now be on, post-anticompetitive behavior, is the same as 
the efficient one that consumers would have preferred. After all, the path 
is one geared to a dominant finn's conduct designed to enhance its own 
economic welfare through the means of subverting consumer choice. 
Anticompetitive conduct is by definition undermining consumer 
choice. It is necessary for a dominant firm to use these tactics to exclude 
rivals only if enough consumers prefer the rivals' products and the domi-
nant firm cannot woo them otherwise. So although, in the long run, the 
market may move to make the dominant firm efficient once again, it will 
be efficient around the direction generated by the firm, against the con-
sumers' wishes and without, perhaps; preferred rivals. 
This view clearly affects one's risk analysis of consequences of error 
costs and will also lead to an evaluation of the costs of false negatives as 
being very high. It cautions decision makers to be risk averse to decisions 
that leave open increases in false negatives. 
2005] ASSESSING ANTITRUST LIABILITY 1183 
The profit sacrifice test therefore has great appeal compared to the 
market correction approach, for all the reasons those who advocate the 
profit sacrifice test suggest: it probes the implication of a firm's conduct 
more thoroughly and thus is more able to capture true negatives than the 
market correction approach (its improvement over the older Areeda-
Turner test has been much discussed in the literature); it has clarity and 
simplicity, making it easier for courts to apply; and it can provide suffi-
cient precedential value to guide firms as to what will be considered prob-
lematic aggressive conduct when battling it out in the marketplace. 
However, there was a brief discussion of a point during another pres-
entation of these viewpoints that struck me and caused me to shift in favor 
of the consumer welfare effects test.44 The shift in position is also consis-
tent with McGowan's view that sometimes experience ought to trump 
logic. The discussion was with regard to what the effect would be on firms 
if the courts indeed adopted a consumer welfare effects standard. It was 
suggested that firms would probably, right from the start, begin accruing 
evidence that their conduct enhanced consumer welfare over any reduc-
tion. This implies that dominant firms would engage in their own con-
sumer welfare effects analysis when evaluating a new course of conduct, 
and, though motivated by antitrust concerns, this self-evaluation would 
ultimately benefit consumers because of its impact on the firms' decision-
making process. 
If this is correct, other advantages would occur as well. As it becomes 
standard for firms to incorporate consumer welfare assessments along with 
the other measures of feasibility and profitability of any new venture, a 
likely outcome is that the means and methods of measuring such effects 
will improve over time. It also suggests that the plaintiffs and defendants 
will become more efficient at presenting cogent evidence and courts more 
efficient at evaluating net consumer welfare benefits. Experience teaches 
us that implementing legal standards to create incentives for the actors to 
better achieve certain social goals is effective. Certainly we have found 
that the implementation of the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amend-
ment dramatically improved police investigative activity, occupational 
health and safety laws have made the workplace dramatically safer, and 
product liability for design defects has caused firms to produce far safer 
goods than in the past century. 
Though it is has been debated for sometime now whether the imple-
mentation of these standards in other areas of law has gone too far, there is 
44. This discussion took place at the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust 
Law Annual Spring Meeting (Mar. 30, 2005). 
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no question regarding the vast improvement in these matters compared 
with over a century ago. Thus, if it becomes routine in the corporate world 
to incorporate consumer welfare analysis in the decision-making process, 
this atmosphere will permeate throughout the market system. The effect is 
likely to motivate firms to be more consistent with the goals of antitrust 
law, and the firms are likely to give consumer welfare effect its best and 
most efficient expression. Experience teaches us so. 
